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In the summer of 2017, hundreds of thousands of videos of the 
Syrian conflict suddenly disappeared from YouTube.2 The videos had 
been published on channels like the Aleppo Media Center, the Shaam 
News Agency, and the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, 
which are run by Syrian civil society groups that have been 
documenting war crimes and other human rights violations since the 
conflict began in 2011.3 In a war zone that has been extraordinarily 
difficult for outside investigators to access, the videos provided crucial 
evidence that many hoped would eventually lead to international 
criminal prosecutions.4 
 
1. Associate professor of Law, American University Washington College of 
Law. 
2. Malachy Browne, YouTube Removes Videos Showing Atrocities in Syria, 
N.Y. TIMES(Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/middleeast/syria-youtube-
videos-isis.html [perma.cc/YF4X-SFVA]. 
3. Tech Advocacy: Amount of Content Preserved, Made Unavailable and 
Restored, Syrian Archive, https://syrianarchive.org/en/tech-advocacy 
[https://perma.cc/TFF9-FEMX]; Dia Kayyali, Vital Human Rights 
Evidence in Syria is Disappearing from Youtube, Witness (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-human-rights-evidence-syria-
disappearing-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/SK84-P879]. 
4. See, e.g., Protocol of Cooperation Between the International, Independent 
and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil Society Organisations 
Participating in the Laussane Platform, https://iiim.un.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM_-_Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JM8-BJVW]. There is already precedent for the use 
of social-media evidence in international criminal prosecutions. See 
Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 3 (Aug. 
15, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF 
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One can readily imagine that any of the perpetrators whose crimes 
were caught on these videos would have had an interest in their 
disappearance. But in this case at least, no one in Syria was responsible. 
The disappearance of the videos was the work of YouTube’s software 
engineers.5 Employees of the Silicon Valley-based social media platform 
had no intention of deleting potential war crimes evidence; they were 
trying, in fact, to fight terrorism online.6 They had introduced a new 
algorithm to improve the rate at which YouTube could detect and 
remove terrorist content7 – but the algorithm had been unable to 
consistently distinguish propaganda posted by ISIS from war crimes 
documentation posted by human rights activists.8 
In response to media coverage, many of the videos were 
subsequently restored.9 But the incident was illustrative of a more 
fundamental, and less appreciated, development: the influx of new 
actors into the landscape of international criminal investigations. 
YouTube employees, like many of the other new actors in this 
space, do not enter this landscape with the same set of professional 
norms or operate according to the same priorities as the court-
appointed investigators who have traditionally dominated this work. 
Indeed, for YouTube and other social media companies that have 
become important repositories of war crimes evidence, international 
criminal investigations are not something they ever intended, or 
anticipated, being involved in.10 
 
[https://perma.cc/54D9-6VJN] (relying on video posted to social media 
in the issuance of the arrest warrant). 
5. Bernhard Warner, Tech Companies Are Deleting Evidence of War 




6. Kent Walker, Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Tight Terrorism Online, 
GOOGLE (June 18, 2017), https://www.blog.google/around-the-
globe/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-online-
terror/[perma.cc/XN6G-SD34]. 
7. Tim Mak, Critics Say YouTube Hasn’t Done Enough to Crack Down on 




8. Armin Rosen, Erasing History: YouTube’s Deletion of Syria War Videos 





10. YouTube is not the only social media platform where such evidence has 
been uploaded. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, 
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Investigating Atrocities 
The first major criminal investigations of atrocity crimes in the 
post-Nuremberg period began with the UN-created ad hoc tribunals of 
the nineties. The tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda took 
as a given that gathering evidence would require in-person contact 
between their staff and the victims and witnesses of the crimes they 
sought to prosecute.11 The same was true with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), established in 200212 – although access 
difficulties meant the ICC soon began to rely on a network of human 
rights groups and UN-affiliated agencies to help them gather evidence 
in places the Court’s staff could not reach.13  
As others have documented, the introduction of these so-called 
“intermediaries” into the investigative process caused significant 
challenges, culminating in the ICC’s first case almost being derailed on 
the opening day of trial.14 Such problems were a harbinger of the 
challenges that now loom as technology promises to transform the 
investigatory landscape beyond recognition. 
In 2007, Apple’s launch of the iPhone – and the cheaper alternatives 
that subsequently flooded the market - set the course for a major 
disruption in the way that international criminal investigations 
operate.15 Soon, millions of people across the world – including in areas 
 
Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 11 (Aug. 15 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF [https://perma.cc/54D9-
6VJN] (indicating Facebook has been used to upload such videos). 
11. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA & UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE 




GYP7] (discussing the ICTY’s “information gathering” techniques). 
12. See Understanding the International Criminal Court, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf [perma.cc/Z2VP-
A77K] (referring to the “field work” of the Court and its obligation to 
ensure security to the “individuals who interact with them,” implying in-
person contact).   
13. For a survey of this development, and the problems that arose from it, 
see generally Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT’L. 
FOREIGN AFF. 121 (2009). 
14. See id. at 123; Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to 
be Learned from the Lubanga Judgment, NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30, 37 
(2013). 
15. See Rebecca Hamilton, New Technologies in International Criminal 
Investigations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING, 112, 131–33 
(2018).  
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Social Media Platforms in International Criminal Investigations 
216 
where atrocities were underway – had a video camera in their pockets 
virtually 24/7.16 This created the possibility of user-generated evidence 
– digital documentation done in or near real-time by those at the scene 
of the crime - being produced on a mass scale.17 And with the advent 
of social media, people began posting this documentation online.18 
This conflagration of developments first came together during the 
conflict that followed the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al 
Assad in 2011.19 As Google product manager, Justin Kosslyn, put it: 
“The Syrian civil war is in many ways the first YouTube conflict in the 
same way that Vietnam was the first television conflict.”20 The user-
generated evidence that Syrians posted on social media became an 
invaluable resource for the human rights groups that the Syrian 
government refused to allow into the country.21 Advocates of 
international criminal justice began thinking how they could harness 
the material that Syrians were, in many instances, risking their lives to 
record. 
In 2013, Western donors supported a major conference, convened 
at UC Berkeley, to figure out how best to use the growing amount of 
digital evidence being posted online in international criminal 
investigations.22 Around the same time, former ICC investigator, 
William Wiley, founded an international criminal investigations non-
profit, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, 
which trained Syrians on how to document what they were seeing in 
 
16. See Elizabeth O’Shea and Kelly Matheson, 5 Reasons to Use Video as 
Evidence for ICC Crimes, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20161111/5-reasons-use-video-
evidence-icc-crimes [perma.cc/Y5PJ-998Z] (discussing the pervasive use 
of smartphone video by witnesses to atrocities). 
17. See generally, Rebecca J. Hamilton, User-Generated Evidence, 57 COL. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2018). 
18. Id. at 16. 
19. Marc Lynch, et al., SYRIA’S SOCIALLY MEDIATED CIVIL WAR  7 (United 
States Inst. of Peace, Peaceworks No. 91, 2014). 
20. Rosen, supra note 8. 
21. See e.g. Syria: Coordinated Chemical Attacks on Aleppo Security Council 
Should Impose Sanctions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017), 
[perma.cc/5S7L-EL75] (discussing Human Rights Watch’s use of video 
uploaded by the Aleppo Media Center to call attention to a February 
2017 chemical weapons attack in Aleppo). 
22. HUM. RTS. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L., DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS: 
USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE 
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ways that would be useful for future international criminal 
prosecutions.23  
In 2016, the United Nations established an International, Impartial 
and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to gather documentation that 
could potentially be used in future prosecutions of international crimes 
committed in Syria.24 The IIIM, like other external actors, has thus far 
been barred from entering Syria by the Syrian government, so it has 
focused on the collation of digital documentation, even signing a 
Protocol of Cooperation with Syrian civil society groups that collect 
digital evidence.25  
The growing reliance on digital evidence in international criminal 
investigations now extends beyond Syria. In 2017, the UN established 
a Fact-Finding Commission to investigate atrocities against the Muslim 
minority Rohingya population in Myanmar.26 Prohibited from entering 
the country by the Myanmar government, its investigation also relied 
heavily on digital documentation, in particular evidence posted on 
Facebook.27 Then in 2018, the UN established a new independent body 
for Myanmar, designed to function like the IIIM for Syria, that would 
 
23. Melinda Rankin, The Future of International Criminal Evidence in New 
Wars? The Evolution of the Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability, 20 J. GENOCIDE RES. 392 (2018).  
24. G.A. Res. A/71/L/48, International, Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those 
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law 
Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
Int’l., Impartial Indep. Mechanism, Protocol of Cooperation between the 
International, Independent and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil 




25. Int’l., Impartial Indep. Mechanism, Protocol of Cooperation between the 
International, Independent and Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil 




26. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx 
[perma.cc/M25J-3FAE]. 
27. See United Nations Human Rights Council, Myanmar UN Fact-Finding 
Mission Releases its Full Account of Massive Violations by Military in 
Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?N
ewsID=23575&LangID=E [perma.cc/2EZ8-EKAK].  
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“[b]e able to make use of the information collected by the fact-finding 
mission and continue to collect evidence.”28 
Digital Documentation 
There is justifiable excitement about what digital documentation 
can offer international criminal investigations.29 When those who are 
on the scene during, or soon after, the commission of atrocity crimes 
record what they see, the access problems facing outside investigators 
are overcome and evidence that may otherwise be lost or destroyed is 
instead preserved.30 But as with any new technology, digital 
documentation in general, and user-generated evidence in particular, 
raises challenges.  
To date, much of the scholarly conversation about the challenges 
of working with digital evidence has focused on the evidence itself. One 
key question is whether the evidence can be authenticated.31 Unless 
judges can be assured of the authenticity of digital evidence, its 
potential value to international criminal investigations will not be 
realized. And this is a concern that will only continue to grow with the 
emergence of so-called “deep fakes” – falsified videos that are 
sophisticated enough to deceive most viewers.32 Another question has 
involved how to train non-professionals to undertake documentation in 
a way that will be useful for an international criminal investigator.33 
And more recently, as scholars have begun to grasp the sheer volume 
of digital documentation being posted online, new concerns have been 
raised about how to sort through hours of footage and coordinate the 
transfer of digital evidence to those who may be able to use it.34 
 
28. Human Rights Council Res. 39/2, U.N. Dᴏᴄ. A/HRC/RES/39/2, ¶ 23 
(Sept. 27, 2018).  
29. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF L., supra note 22. 
30. See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 3. 
31. Nikita Mehandru & Alexa Koeing, Open Source Evidence and the 
International Criminal Court, HARV. HUM. RTS J. (April 15, 2019), 
https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/open-source-evidence-and-the-
international-criminal-court/#_ftn1 [perma.cc/7GV3-L34G]. 
32. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge 
for Privacy, Security and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019); 
see also Alexa Koenig, ”Half the Truth is Often a Great Lie”: Deep Fakes, 
Open Source Information, and International Criminal Law, 113 AJIL 
UNBOUND, 250, 251 (2019). 
33. See Jay D. Aronson, The Utility of User Generated Content in Human 
Rights Investigations, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND PRACTICE 129, 131 (Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018) 
(explaining how most footage captured by citizens shows evidence that a 
crime occurred, not evidence of who might be responsible).   
34. See Hamilton, supra note 17, at 32–33. 
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All of these issues are worthy of scrutiny. But there is another 
aspect of the move toward digital evidence that has received less 
attention, even though its implications are just as significant for the 
future of international criminal investigations. Specifically, digital 
evidence does not just bring a new form of evidence into the 
international criminal justice system, it brings in a host of new actors 
as well. 
New Actors in the Investigatory Landscape 
International criminal investigations have traditionally been 
dominated by trained investigators with professional obligations to a 
public judicial institution.35 Today though, the composition of actors 
involved in these investigations is skewing increasingly toward private 
actors, who have no public-facing obligations.36 These actors include 
ordinary citizens, civil society groups, and lawyers.37 They also, though 
perhaps less visibly, include technology companies like Google, which 
owns YouTube.38 
YouTube is part of a social media industry that is largely self-
regulated.39 It writes its own rules – or, in YouTube’s terminology, 
‘Community Guidelines’, which it uses to determine whether to remove 
 
35. See CHRISTIAN AXBOE NIELSEN & JANN K. KLEFFNER, A HANDBOOK ON 





36. See Mehandru & Koenig, supra note 31 (“[C]itizens are increasingly 
uploading vast amounts of digital imagery and videos to social media 
platforms to spread awareness of human rights violations and possible war 
crimes . . . “).  
37. See, e.g., Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes 
Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International 
Criminal Investigations and Trials, 41 Fᴏʀᴅʜᴀᴍ Iɴᴛ’ʟ L.J. 283, 332 (2018) 
(describing international organizations and lawyers’ efforts to collect 
evidence in Syria, as well as citizen journalism).  
38. See id. at 318 (discussing the use of Google Earth satellite images); see 
also Kevin B. Johnston, Top 4 Companies Owned by Google, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/investing/companies-owned-by-google/ 
[https://perma.cc/GR2E-A7PU] (noting that Google owns YouTube). 
39. See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Jean Burgess, Alice Marwick & 
Thomas Poell eds., 2017) (discussing the broad safe harbor protections 
offered to U.S.-based social media platforms, as well as the steps these 
platforms have undertaken, on their own accord, to regulate content 
appearing on their sites)..]. 
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content that appears on its platform.40 But it is also part of a legally 
pluralist landscape.41 Many other actors – including states, civil society 
groups, and international organizations, argue that different rules or, 
at a minimum, enforcement priorities, should apply in certain cases.42 
And it was exactly this contestation over enforcement priorities that 
lay behind the sudden disappearance of so many Syrian videos from 
YouTube in the summer of 2017.  
The change to YouTube’s algorithm was catalyzed by the U.K 
government, which, ironically enough, was seeking to respond to an 
attack on civilians on its territory.43 In May 2017, a radicalized British 
national, Salman Abedi, launched a suicide bomb attack on a pop 
concert in Manchester, England, killing 22 concertgoers, including 7 
children.44 Abedi had reportedly been influenced by a Libyan group 
that was an Al Qaeda affiliate.45 In the aftermath of the bombing, then 
British Prime Minister, Theresa May, gathered with G7 leaders in Italy 
to try to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. 46 
 
40. Policies and Safety: Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/about/policies/#community-guidelines 
[https://perma.cc/MAB5-67XJ].  
41. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big 
Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C.  
DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2018) (describing a “pluralist model of speech 
control”); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and 
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1664 (2018) 
(describing a “pluralistic system of influence” over content moderation). 
For further development of this concept, see Rebecca J. Hamilton, 
Governing the Global Public Square (on file with author). 
42. See, e.g., James Griffiths, Governments are Rushing to Regulate the 
Internet. Users Could End Up Paying the Price, CNN (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/uk/internet-regulation-uk-australia-
intl-gbr/index.html [perma.cc/7R3H-2A7J] (discussing calls for 
governmental regulation of social media in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Singapore). 
43. Arjun Kharpal, Google Outlines 4 Steps to Tackle Terrorist-Related 
Content on YouTube, CNBC (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/19/google-youtube-tackles-terrorist-
videos.html [https://perma.cc/FP3J-Q9BV]. 
44. Manchester Attack: Who Were the Victims?, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40012738 [perma.cc/7XUU-ET4H].  
45. Jamie Doward et al., How Manchester Bomber Salman Abedi Was 
Radicalized by his Links to Libya, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedi-
manchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation [https://perma.cc/V7V2-92HP]. 
46. Anushka Asthana, G7 Leaders Agree Steps to Tackle Terrorism after 
Manchester Bombing, THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/26/theresa-may-
calls-g7-leaders-help-prosecute-foreign-fighters [perma.cc/U5LE-MARB].  
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“We are already working with social media companies to halt the 
spread of extremist material … that is warping young minds” said 
May.  “I am clear that corporations can do more. Indeed they 
have a social responsibility to now step up their efforts to remove 
harmful content from their networks.”47  
The change in algorithm at YouTube over the summer of 2017 was 
part of a response to May’s concerns.48 From YouTube’s perspective, 
the change made sense. Soon after May’s plea, the European 
Commission pushed for greater regulation of online content,49 and as of 
2019, YouTube and other major social media companies have just one 
hour to remove terrorist content that is reported to them.50 If they 
repeatedly fail to do so, they face fines of up to 4% of their global 
turnover.51  
Scholars have highlighted how so-called collateral censorship – 
where states get private companies to enforce their regulatory goals for 
them – leads to over-removal of content.52 It makes business sense for 
YouTube to preemptively remove anything that could potentially be 
reported as “terrorist content” – even if this comes at the cost of 
 
47. Id. 
48. Kent Walker, Four Steps We’re Taking Today to Fight Terrorism Online, 
Google (June 18, 2017), https://www.blog.google/around-the-
globe/google-europe/four-steps-were-taking-today-fight-online-terror/ 
[perma.cc/V7FP-5ZRS]. Subsequently, the European Commission issued 
a communication on the “prevention, detection, and removal of illegal 
online content, including hatred, violence, and terrorist propaganda.” 
European Parliament, Legislative Train, Area of Justice and 
Fundamental Rights: Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content 
Online (July 2019) [hereinafter European Parliament, Communication on 




[perma.cc/K24M-KEZR] (proposing legislation requiring major social 
media companies to remove terrorist content within one hour, under 
threat of fine). 
49. See European Parliament, Communication on Preventing Online Illegal 
Content supra note 48.  
50. European Parliament Press Release, Terrorist Content Online Should be 





52. See e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298, 2324 (2014). 
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removing content that could be used for war crimes prosecutions.53 And 
YouTube is not the only platform for whom the incentives line up in 
this way.54 
After the mainstream media reported on the sudden disappearance 
of the Syrian videos, YouTube acknowledged that the technical changes 
it had made required improvements, and explained that “When it’s 
brought to our attention that a video or channel has been removed 
mistakenly, we act quickly to reinstate it.”55 They urged those who 
wanted their videos reinstated, or who were worried about future videos 
being removed, to provide YouTube with additional context explaining 
why the video was not being posted simply to glorify violence.56  
The Syrian Archive, which coordinates with a number of the Syrian 
groups doing documentation work,57 has worked with YouTube to 
restore 200,000 of the videos that were removed during the summer of 
2017.58 But providing YouTube with the context it seeks is time-
consuming work, and Syrian civil society groups are already over-
stretched.59 Most simply do not have the capacity to do what YouTube 
is asking.60 Moreover, as Syrian Archive founder, Hadi al-Khatib, 
explains, there are plenty of instances in which the person who uploaded 
the content has since been imprisoned or killed.61 As of January 2019, 
 
53. See id. at 2299 (“Owners of private infrastructure, hoping to reduce legal 
uncertainty and to ensure an uncomplicated business environment, often 
have incentives to be helpful even without direct government threats.”).  
54. Facebook’s latest algorithms for example, have helped the platform ensure 
that only 0.04 percent of uploaded content that it believes would fall afoul 
of its guidelines on terrorist content ever actually appeared online; in 
other words, its pre-emptive removal rate for this content is a stunningly 
high 99.6 percent. See Community Standards Enforcement Report, 
Facebook Transparency (May 2019), 
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-
enforcement#terrorist-propaganda [perma.cc/T5KW-JPEA]. 
55. Rosen, supra note 8 (quoting a statement released by YouTube in 
response to concerns about the disappearance of the Syrian videos). 
56. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6345162?hl=en 
[perma.cc/K4RU-AMCN]. 
57. See SYRIAN ARCHIVE, https://syrianarchive.org/en [perma.cc/PM3M-
XRCX] (“The Syrian Archive is a Syrian-led and initiated collective of 
human rights activists dedicated to curating visual documentation 
relating to human rights violations and other crimes committed by all 
sides during the conflict in Syria with the goal of creating an evidence-
based tool for reporting, advocacy and accountability purposes.”). 
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some 190,000 of the videos removed in the summer of 2017 remain 
unavailable.62 And the Syrian Archive reports numerous instances of 
restored content being removed again, with the removal-restoration 
cycle being repeated multiple times with respect to the same video.63 
Even if Syrian activists continue to make progress with the 
YouTube removals that arose from the 2017 algorithm change, the 
broader problem is not going away. Social media platforms are 
operating in a regulatory landscape that is in flux, and they will 
continue to adjust their content moderation systems to sustain their 
business model. Sometimes, especially in the face of a media outcry, 
changes that have a detrimental impact on the preservation of potential 
war crimes evidence will be reversed. But, unlike the actors who have 
traditionally comprised international criminal investigations, the 
technology companies who have unwittingly found themselves in this 
investigatory space cannot be expected to prioritize the goals of justice 
and accountability in the face of competing business demands. 
YouTube’s tagline is “Broadcast Yourself.”64 People around the 
world have taken up the invitation, including people whose lives are 
being lived out in conflict zones. Proponents of international criminal 
justice have seized upon the resulting material for its evidentiary value, 
and we are seeing the field of international criminal investigations in 
the midst of a major transformation as a consequence. There has been 
plenty of commentary about this transformation in terms of the 
challenges and opportunities that the evidence itself brings. But less 
attention has been given to what these technology-driven developments 
have done to expand the range of actors within the broader ecosystem 
in which international criminal investigations operate. Relying on 
digital evidence also means relying on the platforms who host it.  
 
 
62. Removals of Syrian human rights content: April 2019, SYRIAN ARCHIVE 
(Apr. 2019), https://syrianarchive.org/en/tech-advocacy/april-
takedowns.html [https://perma.cc/B927-9H98]. 
63. Rosen, supra note 8. 
64. Alex Hudson, Is Google Taking the ‘You’ Out of Youtube?, BBC Nᴇᴡs 
(May 16, 2011), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9485376.stm 
[https://perma.cc/9GN6-55DT].  
